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Abstract:  Despite their progress Bulgaria and Romania significantly differ from the EU 
economies. In this article, on the basis of the theoretical and empirical achievements of the 
theory of optimal and (endogenous) currency areas we study to what extent the two South 
European economies are able to adopt the common economic (and above all monetary) policy 
of the EU, and to what extent the convergence to the EU stimulates the economic 
development of these countries. Despite the similarities, the two countries now differ 
fundamentally in their choice of a monetary regime – while Romania uses inflation targeting 
and a flexible exchange rate, Bulgaria has adopted a currency board regime. For this purpose 
we analyze: (i) the degree of nominal, real and financial convergence and synchronization of 
the economic cycle with that of the European Union (using unconditional β convergence 
approach). Income and price levels, inflation rate, interest rate, monetary aggregates, credit, 
productivity etc. are among the studied variables; (ii) the resistance to different external and 
internal shocks (using VAR model) as well as (iii) the mechanisms for balancing and 
absorption of these shocks. To give a better comparative picture we compose the panel 
including Hungary and Czech Republic.  
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Introduction 
 
With the expansion of the EU the theoretical and especially the empirical 
investigations of convergence become of increasing importance
2. Traditionally this importance is explained by the necessity of the new member 
states to have similar economic cycles. First, this means that their main economic and 
financial variables should move as a single one in order for the common monetary 
policy (and common currency) to have the desired effect. And second this effect has 
to be symmetrical for the countries in the zone (i.e. the monetary policy transmission 
effect has to be identical). If convergence and synchrony are relatively weak and the 
countries are subject to asymmetric shocks, then it is necessary to have well-working 
alternatives (replacing the exchange rate and the monetary policy) mechanisms for 
absorption of the shocks (for example free movement of goods and capital, labor 
market flexibility, structural diversification of the economy, possibilities for 
redistribution etc.). All these ideas can be found to a certain extent in the frames of 
the different versions of the optimal currency area theory (classical, endogenous, 
fiscal etc.
3)  
 
The proposed research is not a theoretical one. It has a purely empirical task – to 
measure the state of convergence of Bulgaria and Romania – the two countries that 
will last join the EU and later on - the eurozone. On April the 25
th 2005 Bulgaria and 
Romania signed an accession treaty with the EU under which is very likely that they 
become full members of the EU in January 2007 and of the Eurozone in 2009 – 2010 
if things go well will. These are above all political decisions. Despite the progress 
made by the two countries, they still differ from the European economy as well as 
from the countries of the first accession wave. Therefore an empirical investigation of 
the convergence stage of Bulgaria and Romania is of current interest especially while 
doubts on the readiness of the two countries to join the EU are expressed frequently.  
 
While the empirical research of the first accession wave is abundant, Bulgaria and 
Romania are the subjects of a few sketchy surveys that are besides a part of a greater 
study. According to the review (of the empirical research on the correlation of the 
business cycles in the post-communist countries) done by Fidrmuc and Korhonen 
(2004), Bulgaria and Romania have been included in just 3 of 27 such studies. The 
picture is the same concerning the research on convergence of other economic and 
financial variables (besides those of GDP and income). Analyses exist of course like 
those of Brada and Kutan (2001, 2002), NOBE (2002), De Grauwe and Schnabl 
(2004), Suepell (2003), Bolle and Blessing (2005) etc., but these too are not focused 
on Bulgaria and Romania and do not aim to comprehend wholly the convergence of 
                                              
2 For the discussion of the contemporary state of measuring convergence see Sala-i-Martin (2003).  
3 Regarding the evolution and the different versions of the theory of the optimal currency area see the 
survey of Goodhart (1998), Lafrance and St-Amant (1999), Mongelli (2002) and Horvath (2003), De 
Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). A complete topology of the problems of convergence of the new and 
potential members of the EU is exposed in the excellent analysis of von Hagen and Traistaru (2004).  
There are two very recent studies dealing with the β convergence of transition countries – NOBE (2002), 
Varblane and Vahter (2005) and Angeloni and al., (2005), Bolle and Blessing (2005).  2
Bulgarian and Romanian economy
4. The main objective is the measurement of the 
real convergence (at the expense of the nominal), whose significance is taking on a 
increasing importance
5. 
 
The empirical research on convergence for Bulgaria and Romania is justified not only 
by the lack of such research but also because of the possibility to compare the 
successes and failures of the two countries that began from different starting positions 
and later adopted radically different monetary and exchange rate regimes.  
 
Despite the similarities in the mechanisms of the planned economy Bulgaria and 
Romania had differences in their initial starting positions
6. In contrast to Romania, 
Bulgaria started with a huge foreign debt, accumulated in the second half of the 80’s. 
The shock of the COMECOM collapse was also more significant for the Bulgarian 
than for the Romanian economy. Subsequently, (after the crisis at the end of 1996 
beginning of 1997), Bulgaria adopted a currency board and fixed exchange rate (mid 
1997) which functions successfully to this day (Nenovsky and Hristov, 2002). On its 
part Romania which monetary and exchange rate policies were not explicitly declared 
in the past, now is advancing more and more in the direction of inflation targeting and 
floating exchange rate (Popa and al., 2002, Popa, 2005)
7.  
 
Regardless of the differences in the monetary regimes, in the last few years both 
countries (as a whole this is valid for most of the Balkan countries) have experienced 
a high credit growth which has provoked specific reactions from the central banks of 
the two countries. (Duemwald and al., 2002). This credit dynamic raises the question 
of the relationship between the credit and the two radically different monetary 
regimes. Thus the measurement of the convergence of the two economies takes on not 
only a practical but also a certain theoretical importance. The evaluation of the 
convergence, of the reaction to shocks and the condition of the channels for 
absorption of these shocks, provides for institutional comparison of the efficiency of 
the two monetary regimes from the point of view of the accession to the EU and the 
eurozone. In order to be able to compare the two “laying behind” countries with those 
of the first accession wave, where the progress is obvious, we present also the results 
for Hungary and the Czech Republic.  
 
The article is structured as follows: in the first chapter we briefly discuss some 
contradictory points regarding the methodology of the convergence and the joint 
                                              
4 An attempt to compare the stage of convergence between Bulgaria and Romania has been made in 
Nenovsky and Chobanov (2005). Egert (2005) measures the equilibrium exchange rate for Bulgaria and 
Romania and also contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms of balancing the two countries 
with the euro zone.   
5 Almost lacking is the analysis of the institutional convergence, which gives the frames of both the 
nominal and the real convergence. The importance of the institutional characteristics of the post-
communist countries and their significance for EU accession lies in the foundation of the creation and 
monitoring of series of indicators of institutional development, for more details see EBRD (2004) as well 
as Hallet (2004), Freytag (2004), Roland (2005), Back and Laeven (2005).  
6 For more theoretical and empirical discussion on initial starting position see Back and Laeven (2005). 
7 See also Daianu and Lungu (2004).  3
movement in the behavior of the economies. In the second chapter we present the 
state of convergence (unconditional ß  convergence) using a panel model and the 
presence of long term relations (through the method of co-integration) between the 
main macroeconomic variables grouped as nominal, real and financial. The third 
chapter presents the reactions of the two economies to external shocks (external 
shocks are limited to those coming from the European economy). We use VAR 
methodology. The studied period is mid 1997 – present (1997:Q3 – 2005:Q3) 
quarterly data (the use of panel model help to overcome the data limitations problem). 
Finally we discuss the results obtained.   
 
1. Preliminary observations and methodological notes  
Despite the differences of the monetary regimes, the two countries have at first sight 
similar characteristics and give similar results (table 1).  
 
Table 1 Main macroeconomic indicators for Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
 BULGARIA  ROMANIA 
 
  1997  2000 2002 2004  1997  2000 2002 2004 
 
Economic  Growth  -5.6 5.4 4.9 5.6  5.0  8.3 2.1 5.0 
Inflation (eop)  547.7  11.3  3.8 4.0  151.3  40.7  17.8  9.3 
Budget deficit as % of GDP  -3.1  -0.6 -0.6 1.7  -3.5  -4.0 -2.5 -1.1 
Debt as % of GDP  105.1  73.6 54  38.8  16.5  22.7 23.3 18.5 
Growth of Broad Money  351.4  31.4 24.1 23.5  104.9  37.8 38.1 39.9 
Domestic credit as % of GDP  20.81 
 
17.83
 
23.68
 
36.20 
 
  11.57
 
15.63 
 
15.19 
 
Domestic credit Growth   89.5  31.0 27.4 34.2  50.8  11.4 39.8 21.2 
Non-government credit  46.7  17.0 44.0 48.6  33.8  30.0 51.1 37.9 
Interest Rate   74.2  3.9  4.0  2.6  47.2  35.0  20.4  20.2 
Foreign reserve Growth     15.8  12.6  27.7    46.8  27.2  59.3 
Current Account as % of GDP   4.1  -5.6  -5.3  -7.5  -6.0  -3.7  -3.3  -5.3
(f) 
FDI as % of GDP    8.1  5.9  10.9  3.4  2.8  2.5   
FDI as % of GDP 
  4.9  7.9 5.8 6.7  3.4  2.8 2.5  
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
2000=100   82.8  100  109.5 122.6  82.8  100  104.2 109.9 
Productivity as % of  the EU 
level
8 
28.4
 (e)  
 
31.9 
 
33.2 
 
31.1
 (f)  
 
  28.4 
 
32.7 
 
36.0
 (f)  
 
Openness of the Economy   111.9  116.8 112.9 127.1  65.4  71.4  76.6  83.5 
 
 
 
 
                                              
8Labour productivity per person employed (GDP in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) per person employed 
relative to EU-25 (EU-25 = 100)); Source: Eurostat  4
Chart 1 – 6 illustrate the dynamic of some of the main variables for Bulgaria and 
Romania compared to those of the EU.  
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Even though it carries certain information, graphic (visual) presentation of the 
dynamic of the main variables is not sufficient for in-depth conclusions about the 
stage of convergence. Therefore we use econometric tests for the existence of a long 
term correlation (and decrease of the distance) between the dynamic of the variables 
in the two countries and those of the EU. This directs us straight towards the necessity 
of discussion of some methodological questions about the convergence and the 
common movement of the variables.  
 
Box 1: Methodological notes 
 
What we need to note at first is that despite the apparent unity (especially in the empirical 
literature), the measurement of convergence is not yet fully clarified. This gives us ground for 
making а stipulation that the calculations we will present cannot claim to be either accurate or 
indisputable. After this stipulation we have to focus in brief on (i) the unanimity between 
economists regarding the measurement of the convergence, as well as on (ii) the disputable 
methodological elements in this measurement.  
 
At first glance, the empirical analyses of the convergence show that almost all of them use 
three types of methods (i) method of unconditional β convergence (the variables of the poorer 
countries advance faster than the variables of the richer countries and catch up with them i.e. 
β<0), (ii) of σ convergence (dispersion between the variables in the rich and the poor 
countries decreases with time 
2 2
t t T σ σ < + ) or (iii) method of the conditional β convergence 
(where structural variables characterizing each country are added to the unconditional 
model). First applied to economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 2003), the convergence models are 
later used to study the problems of economic integration, i.e. applied to series of other 
variables (such as prices, wages, productivity, financial variables etc.) with the aim of seeing 
to what extent the countries in a certain integration zone have а tendency to equalize their 
behavior, to function as a single unit and to have a common monetary policy. For example 
Mullineux and Murinde (2003) apply this model to convergence of the financial sector of the 
post-communist economies and in particular of the income of the banks, Holscher (2002) to 
the behavior of the interest rates and Crespo-Cuaresma and al., (2003) to the study of the 
regional differences in the EU.  
 
The methods are applied to the study of the common movement of the variables (their levels) 
as well as to the study only of the cyclical components of these variables (with the aim of  7
observing the similarity on the economic cycle). In order for the cyclical component to be 
extracted, various filters are being used, above all HP (Hodrick-Prescott) and BK (Baxter-
King). The models are run for separate countries as well as increasingly for groups of 
countries (panel models with fixed effects for separate countries and groups of countries).  
 
In the present paper we attempt to measure convergence of the main macroeconomic 
variables with the following panel model:  
(1)  nt m nt
M
m
m nt cn nt x x x ε γ β β + ∆ + + = ∆ −
=
− ∑
1
1  
 
Where  , stands for the difference between a variable for a certain 
country and for the EU.  1 − nt x β  stands for the error correction term and cn β  is the fixed 
effect for the constant for each country. In the case of convergence it is expected that 
β is negative i.e. β<0 reducing the distance with the EU. 
 
We consider that the above model can give us an idea of the convergence. Regarding 
the empiric model, which checks for a presence of co-integration between the 
variables in the studied countries and the EU, we think that confirming such a 
connection does not indicate the presence of convergence. We think that Brada and 
Kutan (2001, 2002) in some respect erroneously interpret the presence of such 
movement as proof of convergence. In fact these co-integration models do not tell us 
if the distance between the variables declines, but only that the variables move 
together i.e. that the connection is stable over the time.  
 
Alongside the traditional division of nominal and real convergence, we also present 
separately the financial convergence, which shows to what extent the dynamic of the 
financial sector (and mostly the banks) is similar to those of the European financial 
sector.  
 
Thus the variables that we have denoted as x in the model: are the following: (i) 
nominal convergence is reduced to nominal income, price level, inflation and money 
supply (M1); (ii) real convergence - which has a growing significance – we reduce to 
real income and productivity; and (iii) regarding the financial variables – we include 
domestic credit in the private sector and to the behavior of the interest rates on 
deposits and interest spread (the difference between the interest rate of deposits and 
the interest rate of credits). Interest spread tells us about the efficiency and the level 
of integration of the banking system in the EU banking area.  
 
As a whole the logic of the empirical investigation is the consistent. After we have 
seen the state of convergence (nominal, real and financial) through the described 
models, we carry out a simulation of shocks on the Bulgarian and Romanian 
economy, throughout the EU. EU shocks are reduced to the following: (i) demand 
side shock (real income), (ii) shocks in the monetary policy – interest rates, (iii) 
shocks concerning inflation and (iv) shocks in the real exchange rate or price 
differential. We use the methodology of reaction to the shocks in the frame of the 
VAR models (impulse response). Finally we discuss the state of some of the channels 
for equilibrating these shocks (in the case of Bulgaria) and summarize the results of 
the study.   8
 
2  State of convergence – interpretation of results 
 
The results of the econometric tests of the panel model (which includes four countries 
– Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic) are summarized in tables 2 
and 2a.  
 
As a whole the tests show that some elements of convergence exists with the 
remarkable exception of Romania, where convergence is present in none of the 
spheres (the signs of the fixed effects for Romania are positive and often not 
significant) In contrast to Romania, in Bulgaria nominal convergence is mainly 
observed – in the nominal income, in the general price level as well as in the behavior 
of the interest rates and the interest spread. Real convergence for Bulgaria does not 
exist. Within the frame of the nominal convergence it is interesting that for Bulgaria 
nominal convergence of the monetary aggregate M1 does not exist. Convergence of 
productivity is also absent. The difference of these two countries with Hungary and 
the Czech Republic is obvious: with these countries convergence is observed for 
almost all spheres with the exception of the interest rates.   
 
The presence of the currency board in Bulgaria is a logical explanation of the strong 
convergence of the interest rates in Bulgaria (due to the principle of the automatic 
adherence of the country’ monetary policy to the monetary stance of the anchor 
country (via the fixed exchange rate and monetary base coverage). In general it could 
be supposed that the currency board regime provides a considerably stronger and 
faster nominal convergence in comparison to the discretionary monetary regime 
(Romania)
9 but it is not a sufficient condition for real convergence (here the set of 
structural reforms is needed). The latter is determined by a series of other factors, 
above all microeconomic and structural ones. Concerning the lack of convergence on 
monetary supply, this lack could be explained with credit dynamics (monetary 
multiplayer) and eventually with the restrictive measures taken by BNB (increase in 
required reserves)
10. In some respects these measures perturb the automatic link 
between the foreign reserves and monetary supply (i.e. they have influence on the 
monetary multiplayer).  
                                              
9 The Currency board (similar to the gold standard) possesses two major effects – discipline effect and 
credibility effect.  
10 On the credit dynamics in Bulgaria and Romania see the IMF study Duenwald and al. (2005). 9 
 
Table 2 The Results of the tests for unconditional β convergence (model 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: t statistics are given in brackets
 nominal  real  financial 
 GDP Price  level  Money 
aggregate    
M1 
Real GDP 
growth  
Productivity Credit  Credit  for 
the private 
sector 
Interest 
rates on 
deposits 
Interest 
spread 
β -0.496 
(-4.269) 
-0.245 
(-1.682) 
-0.540 
(-2.610) 
-0.065 
(-0.377) 
0.092 
(0.434) 
-1.64203 
(-2.941) 
-0.387 
(-1.851) 
-0.170 
(-1.588) 
-0.051 
(-1.302) 
β  Bg  -0.009  -0.010 0.004  0.331 0.003  0.016  0.030  -0.857 -0.470 
β Ro  0.036  0.034  0.033  0.110  nа 0.034  0.034   0.178 
β Cz  -0.020 -0.018  -0.020  -0.100  -0.002 -0.037  -0.063  0.479  0.156 
β Hu  -0.006 -0.007  -0.016  -0.312  -0.002 -0.012  0.001  0.378  0.136 
Lag               0.286 
(3.399) 
R2 0.275  0.291 0.273  0.216  0.156  0.235  0.296 0.217 0.376 
Prob  (F)  0  0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 10 
Table 2a   The degree of unconditional β convergence (= table 2) 
 
 nominal  real  financial 
 GDP  Price  level  Money 
aggregate  M1 
Real growth 
of GDP 
Productivity Credit  Credit for the 
private sector 
Interest rates on 
deposits 
Interest 
spread 
All four 
countries 
average weak  to   
average 
weak to 
average 
weak none  weak  average  weak  to   
average 
weak 
Bulgaria weak  average none  none  none  none  none  strong  strong 
Romania  none none  none  none  no  data  none none  no  data  non 
Czech average  average  average  strong weak average average  none  non 
Hungary weak  weak  average  strong  weak  average non  none  non 11 
When we turn towards tests of co-integration between the main variables
11 again it can be seen that for Romania, the presence of such a movement is 
least expressed as well as the restoration towards it (in the case of its existence). 
Considerably “better” are the results for Bulgaria where as a whole the main 
macro variables move together with those of the Eurozone and the equilibrium 
is restored in most of the cases.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
11 A similar test with monthly data up to 2004 was carried out by Nenovsky and Chobanov (2005). 12 
 
Table 3 Degree of common movement of the nominal, real and financial  variables 
 
  Price 
Level 
 
Inflation Broad 
Money 
Real 
income 
Productivity Internal 
Credit 
Interest 
rate 
Bulgaria   average  
2.8* 
(18) 
3** 
none 
(weak) 
strong  
2.2 (15.1) 
2.5 
none average 
6.3  
(12.4)  
6  
average 
6.6 
(8.9) 
14 
Strong 
0.75  
(17.3) 
1 
Romania   weak 
2.9  
(4) 
50 
none average 
3.6  
(5.1) 
10 
none   none  weak 
1.4  
(34.3) 
33 
average 
9  
(6.5) 
3 
Hungary  average 
1  
(43) 
14 
none 
(weak) 
strong 
1.6 (26.6) 
2 
none average 
6  
(10.8) 
16 
average 
2.4  
(6.1) 
8 
average 
2.3  
(3.4) 
10 
Czech 
Republic 
strong 
0.9  
(7.7) 
3 
strong 
1.2  
(3.9) 
2 
average 
2.1  
(10.6) 
7 
Weak 
1.7  
(3.6) 
20 
average 
0.2  
(0.6) 
6 
strong 
3.4  
(4.5) 
3 
average 
2.1  
(1.8) 
11 
* Coefficient of long term equilibrium, ( ) – significance of the connection (t statistics) 
** Speed of restoration of the equilibrium in quarters 
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From the econometric simulations as a whole there is no doubt that using either 
method of analysis of the behavior of the variables (unconditional β 
convergence and co-integration) Bulgaria shows better achievements than 
Romania (especially for the nominal convergence) but considerably worse than 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The shortfall is considerably greater for the 
real convergence, which in fact is the major motive for joining the EU.  
 
3  Reactions to shocks and shocks absorption  
 
The next logical step following the basic idea of the optimal currency area 
theory (OCA) is the simulation of shocks on the Bulgarian and Romanian 
Economy through the VAR models (impulse response). The impact of the 
shocks on the real income of the two countries as well as those of Hungary and 
the Czech Republic are summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6  
Reaction of the real income in Bulgaria Romania, Hungary and the Czech 
republic to the shocks coming from the EU (VAR framework) 
 
 
Shocks coming from the EU 
 
 
From real GDP  From interest rate  From inflation  From real exchange 
rate (inflation 
differential) 
 
Bulgaria Weak  (initially 
(+), later (-), as a 
whole neutral 
effect) 
Weak (alternating (+) and 
(-) effects, slightly 
positive effect) (note: 
interest rate has inverse 
sign) 
Weak (initially 
(+), later (-), as 
a whole slightly 
positive effect) 
Weak (alternating (-) 
and (+) effects, as a 
whole slightly 
negative effect) 
Romania None    None  None  None 
Hungary Average  (initially 
(+), later (-), as a 
whole neutral 
effect) 
Average (strongly 
positive effect) 
Weak (negative 
effect 
dominates)  
Weak  (slightly 
positive effect) 
The Czech 
Republic 
Average (initially 
(+), later (-), as a 
whole slightly 
positive effect) 
Average (strongly 
positive effect) 
Weak (negative 
effect dominates 
) 
Weak (negative effect 
dominates ) 
 
Note: The results of the econometric test (VAR, impulse response) are not presented. 
They are available upon request.  
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From table 6 we can draw a series of reasoning. The first we see the lack of 
reaction of the real income in Romania to the shocks coming from the EU. This 
shows once again that the isolation of the Romanian economy is considerably 
stronger that that of the Bulgarian. In other words this shows that Romania is 
more cut off from the European cycle than Bulgaria. Because Bulgaria as a 
whole has a stronger elasticity towards shocks from the EU its reaction to an 
eventual common shock affecting them (for example in the petrol prices) would 
be similar to the European rection. Bulgaria is coming very close to the Czech 
Republic and Hungary in its relation to the dynamic of the Euro zone (the 
reaction to the shocks coming from the EU are very similar to those of the 
Czech Republic and to Hungary). 
 
 
Regarding shocks coming from the EU countries (chart 8) the following 
dependencies are observed. The real income growth in the EU (a part of the 
external demand for Bulgaria) has a positive effect on the growth of the real 
income in Bulgaria, even though this shock fades within about a year. After a 
year a decrease in production is observed and, as a whole, after two and a half 
years, the original equilibrium is re-established. The net effect of the positive 
shock in the EU is almost zero (the explanations for this can be different – we 
will not focus on them).  
 
The changes in prices of the euro zone have a rapid impact on Bulgarian prices 
via the fixed exchange rate (the equilibrium in re-established). Regarding the 
changes of the interest rates of the euro zone, representing not only the cycle in 
the euro zone but also the discretionary policy of the ECB, the shock is 
neutralized quickly as well although this happens considerably more slowly than 
the price shock.   
 
As a whole the real shocks of the ECB explain about 30% of the changes in 
Bulgarian income. In the frame of this model, the common European external 
shocks (real income, prices, and interest rate) explain about 50% of the changes 
in the changes in Bulgarian real income. This is logical when taking into 
consideration the exposure of the Bulgarian economy to the EU (about 60% of 
the country’s trade).  
 
The inflation differential between Bulgaria and the Euro zone (which reflects to 
a great extent the dynamic of the real exchange rate of the lev to the euro, and 
therefore the cost competitiveness) has a very weak influence on the income of 
the country (the shock is absorbed after about a year) and moreover after great 
fluctuation. Even the effect of a somewhat convex curve is observed (where at 
first after a trimester the growth in Bulgaria is slightly improved but afterwards 
it quickly deteriorates). 
 
Concentrating more on domestic shocks in the case of Bulgaria, we show (chart 
7) the reaction of the real income coming to the shocks coming from domestic 
credit and inflation. The increase of credit has a cyclical impact on income – at 
first income increases, then its effect equals zero and then it rises again. Or as a 
whole with all the stipulations it can be stated that credit does not have a long  
  15
tem effect on real income. Indisputably, though, inflation has a negative effect 
on real income.  
 
Chart 7 Domestic shocks on real income in Bulgaria (coming from Credit and 
Inflation) 
 
Chart 8 Shocks from the euro zone on real income in Bulgaria 
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According to OCA theory, when there is a weak convergence of the economy as 
a whole and a weak integration into the EU and the euro zone, alternative 
mechanisms are needed for the absorption of the possible asymmetric shocks 
i.e. other sources for flexibility of the economy. Some mechanisms are 
presented on box 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We turn to Bulgarian case.  
 
Some comments on the present state of absorption channels in Bulgaria. From the 
currency board balance sheet perspective, the situation is rather stable. The foreign 
exchange reserves are 7.3 billion euro (rising more then 10 times since the beginning of 
Currency board), the monetary base is covered more then 100 % and the fiscal reserve 
at the central bank reaches 2.4 billion euros.  
 
Insofar as a monetary policy under the Currency board is very restricted, the whole 
weight of adjustment falls on fiscal balance. Over the last months (after the formation 
of the big political coalition in Bulgaria) some fundamentals question concerning the 
fiscal policy have been raised. These questions consider (i) to what extent the policy of 
financial stability is compatible with economic growth (ii) to what extent it is necessary 
to keep the equilibrium (and even surplus) of the budget, (iii) to what extent it is useful 
to keep the fiscal reserve in the form of foreign reserves and (iv) what should be the 
Box 2 Possible mechanisms for shock absorption (flexibility of the economy) 
 
1)  Monetary and fiscal policy 
•  Currency board stability 
•  Public finances  and fiscal reserve  
2)  Labor market flexibility 
•  Real wages (flexibility of prices and real wages) 
•  Labor mobility within the country 
•  Migration towards the EU  
3)  Capital mobility and financial system 
•  Capital mobility 
•  Integration of the bank system 
4)  Openness of the economy, diversification, specialization.  
•  Inter-branch specialization (horizontal) 
•  Intra-branch specialization (vertical) 
5)  Productivity and competitiveness 
•  Productivity and unit labor cost 
•  Competitiveness  
6)  Unofficial economy 
•  GDP, labor and income 
•  Fiscal losses 
•  Balance of payments 
7)  Fiscal transfers from the EU 
•  Types of funds 
•  Ability to absorb them  
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expenditure policy (especially the increase in public salaries) and the revenue policy 
(especially tax changes). 
 
Actually the state of public finance is relatively good, with possibilities to keep the 
equilibrium into the future
12.  
 
 
Chart 9: Budget balance (% of the GDP dynamic average for the last 4 trimesters) 
 
 
Graph 10: Government expenditure (% of the GDP dynamic average for the last 4 
trimesters) 
 
  
                                              
12 According to some studies, the smaller and more open the economy is small, as much, the 
bigger the public sector is (as % of GDP), Hagen and Traistaru (2005). This could be explained by 
the fact that through the medium of the public sector (serving as a buffer) the economy can react to 
eventual external or/and exogenous shocks.  
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We think that at the moment the fiscal policy should be conservative and raisonable. 
Practice and theoretical studies show without any doubt that strong fiscal policy and a 
balanced budget are preconditions for long and sustainable economic growth
13. There is 
no possibility of long term influence on saving and investment preferences through 
public finances, as long as the former determine the conditions of growth. All attempts 
at artificial stimulation of domestic demand (when domestic saving is very low and 
where the economy is small and open, eg. Bulgaria) sooner or later will come into 
conflict with external constraints (eg. impossibility to finance the rising current account 
deficit)
14. The experience of Portugal, Greece in the past, and that of Hungary during 
the period 2001 – 2004 (the appearance of the twin deficits)
15 is very eloquent. This 
logic is far more important for Bulgaria, where under the passivity of the Currency 
board (very limited possibility to influence the liquidity of the system) fiscal policy 
takes on directly monetary functions (eg. its impact on interest rates and finally on 
inflation).  
 
Hence, the indispensability of maintaining a bigger-than-normal fiscal reserve, serving 
not only to securing foreign debt payments and Currency board guarantee, but also as a 
buffer from eventual shocks at the moment of EU and eurozone entry, when the fall of 
duties, the rise of co-financing costs and probably some slow down of the economic 
growth could be expected. [We calculated the optimal fiscal reserve for the moment 
(taking the foreign debt payments for the next 4 quarters, assuming the financing of the 
current account deficit above 5% and 5% economic growth) should be around 2.4b euro 
(at 12 % current account deficit) and 1.7 billion euro (at 9 %)]. 
 
Despite the fact that, as a whole, the labor market in Bulgaria is not very flexible, the 
productivity and unit labor cost movement have a relatively favorable dynamic (see 
chart 11 and 12)
16. It can be supposed that the Currency board constraints (via the 
discipline effect and credibility effect) brought about the rise of productivity and 
competitiveness of Bulgarian enterprises, forcing them to restructure in order to be 
competitive. A large part of non-performing enterprises (mainly public one) have 
ceased to operate, which has raised the general level of productivity of the country. The 
cost competitiveness, measured by unit labor cost (ULC) has a relatively good dynamic 
till mid 2002, when the process of restructuring was going strong. These developments 
undoubtedly make it possible to “resist” in circumstances of slow but steady 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. The industry and agriculture sectors continue to 
reduce their ULC, as naturally these costs are lower in agriculture. After mid 2002 in 
the service sector, we observe a continuous rise of ULC and, because of its large 
proportion of the total added value, the general picture has deteriorated.  
                                              
13 This was found by many empirical studies. For example Fatas and Mihov (2003) run a panel of 
91 countries and found that countries which use actively fiscal policy lose growth and obtain 
bigger macroeconomic volatility. In a similar vein is a study carried out by Mehrotra and Peltonen 
(2005) on transition economies, where the authors found that the stronger the fiscal discipline and 
the fiscal consolidation, the faster is real convergence.  
14 For more details about real convergence, current account deficit and the limits of its financing 
by foreign saving, see Bolle and Blessing (2005).  
15 For more details see Csaba (2005). 
16 For more details about the evolution of labor market flexibility in Bulgaria see Nenovsky and 
Koleva (2001)  
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Chart 11 Dynamic of the productivity in Bulgaria and in the euro zone  
 
 
 
Chart 12 Unit labor cost – totally and by sectors  
 
 
When discussing the rise of public wages, the Hungarian experience struck us 
immediately as a worse example of such a policy. Raising public salaries without 
preliminary restructuring of the public sector is a very dangerous step. Moreover, it is 
considered that the best way to realize fiscal consolidation (that stimulates growth and 
restrains inflation) is through expenditure cuts, not raising revenues
17.  
From chart 13 we can see that the Bulgarian economy is more open than Romania’s, 
placing the state of balance of payment and external debt at the heart of policy making. 
                                              
17 See for example Afonso and al. (2005)  
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The more open is an economy the more vulnerably she is to external (and EU shocks) 
and the more important is the role of preliminary convergence. 
 
Chart 13 Dynamic of the openness of the economy and international trade  
 
 
 
We have already mentioned that because of this openness, as well as because 
of the need of the Bulgarian economy to catch up with other european 
economies, consumption and investment grow faster than domestic saving, 
which logically runs down the current account (because of the import of 
foreign savings, on which the country should pay interest). This situation 
raises the question about the sources of current account financing (especially 
in the frame of a fixed exchange rate and a passive monetary policy).  
 
Chart 14 Private transfers 
 
 
Chart 15 Current account deficit covered by FDI  
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The restrictive measures exerted by bank lending on the real sector (taken by BNB in 
2005), as well as the constraint on public finance (coming from the currency board rule 
and Maastricht criteria), logically led to the rise of private foreign debt, which, at the 
end of the first quarter 2005 is 36% of GDP. This way we observe a process of 
transformation of the public to private debt. This is logical if we consider the rising role 
of the private sector in Bulgarian economy. 
 
Chart 16  Private external debt (% of GDP) 
 
The foreign debt structure raises some concerns, not only because the rise of private 
debt as a whole (which exceeds public debt), but also because of the increase of the 
short term part of this debt (about ¼ of the overall debt).  
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Discussion of results  
 
This paper is an empirical one. We have attempted to measure the convergence and 
the synchrony of the behavior of the main macroeconomic variables in Bulgaria and 
Romania as well as the ability of the two economies to react to shocks coming from 
the EU.  
 
We have carried out: (i) the model of the unconditional β convergence in the frame of 
a panel of four countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic, (ii) a 
test for common movement of the dynamic of the main variables through a co-
integration between the variables of the studied countries and the EU, as well as the 
speed of re-establishing this long term correlation (error correction term) and (iii) we 
have simulated shocks with VAR models and finally (iv) we have made some 
observations on the present state of absorption mechanisms in Bulgaria. 
 
Despite the limitations of the modeling and the difficulties with the interpretation of 
the results, we could say that Bulgaria is advancing faster than Romania towards its 
integration into the common dynamic of the European economy. Nevertheless the 
Bulgarian convergence is mainly in the frame of the nominal variables and is lagging 
considerably behind with regard to real convergence, which is present in Hungary and 
the Czech Republic. The nominal convergence is mainly due to the functioning of the 
currency board, which in general leads to a faster nominal convergence because of the 
automatic binding of the monetary policy with that of the anchor currency.  Romania, 
which recently started to apply inflation targeting, implements a radically 
discretionary monetary policy.  
Bulgarian economy is much more elastic to EU shocks (including these coming from 
ECB monetary policy) than Romanian one. We observe some asymmetry of the 
reaction to the shocks – while the negative shock has a stronger effect on Bulgarian 
economy than the positive, which despaired very quickly. 
We can take comfort from the relatively better state of Bulgaria as far as the 
mechanisms of adjustment. Here the most important future policy is to save fiscal 
equilibrium and to accumulate the “above normal” fiscal reserve in order to deal with 
future shocks related to EU accession. 
 
Of course we have only theoretically ascertained the state of convergence. Another 
and a much more complicated question is that of to what extent convergence is 
possible and desired from the point of view of catching up with and joining the euro 
zone.    
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